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bstract
Most of valuable information resources for any organization are stored in the database; it is a serious subject to protect this
nformation against intruders. However, conventional security mechanisms are not designed to detect anomalous actions of database
sers. An intrusion detection system (IDS), delivers an extra layer of security that cannot be guaranteed by built-in security tools, is
he ideal solution to defend databases from intruders. This paper suggests an anomaly detection approach that summarizes the raw
ransactional SQL queries into a compact data structure called hexplet, which can model normal database access behavior (abstract
he user’s profile) and recognize impostors specifically tailored for role-based access control (RBAC) database system. This hexplet
ets us to preserve the correlation among SQL statements in the same transaction by exploiting the information in the transaction-log
ntry with the aim to improve detection accuracy specially those inside the organization and behave strange behavior. The model
tilizes naive Bayes classifier (NBC) as the simplest supervised learning technique for creating profiles and evaluating the legitimacy
f a transaction. Experimental results show the performance of the proposed model in the term of detection rate.
 2016 Electronics Research Institute (ERI). Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
Y-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
eywords: Database security; Anomaly detection; Database intrusion detection; Role-based profiling
.  Introduction
In today’s business realm, the most valuable asset of organizations is its information and thus needs efficient
anagement and protection. Over the last few years, database systems constitute the central of the information systemsnfrastructure because they permit the efficient administration and retrieval of huge amounts of data in addition to
ffer mechanisms that can be employed to certify the integrity of the stored data. Data found in these databases vary
etween private information, banking transactions, personal medical data, and commercial contracts, etc. Any violation
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of security to these databases will lead to passing reputation of the organization, loss of customers’ sureness and might
even lead to lawsuits.
There are many ways to secure databases like user authentication, transaction data encryption, data watermarking,
and intrusion detection. Each of these ways has its benefits and they should work together to reach the maximum security
level of databases. User authentication is a prevention technique that prevents unauthorized users from gaining access
to the database. Transaction data encryption is a prevention technique also; which thwarts attackers from understanding
the data in case of sniffing on the session. Watermarking the data is a detection technique that used to pledge data
integrity. Intrusion Detection is a detection technique that is used to identify the malicious activities as early as possible
if the system prevention mechanisms were bypassed to minimize the harm caused by intruders; for more information
regarding these techniques readers can refer to Panda and Giordano (1999) and Agrawal and Kiernan (2002).
Actually, available database security mechanisms are not basically designed to detect intrusions; they are intended
to avoid the intruders. So, intrusion detection system is considered to be the second defense line. Database Intrusion
is commonly defined as a set of actions that try to violate data integrity, data confidentiality or data availability; while
database intrusion detection is the process of tracking transactions submitted to database and analyzing them to detect
the possible presence of intruders. In general, there are two types of database intrusion attacks (I) insider and (II)
outsider (Panda and Giordano, 1999). The insider’s attacks are the ones when an intruder has all the privileges to
access the database but he performs malicious actions. The outsider’s attacks are the ones when the intruder does not
have proper rights to access the database. He attempts to first rush into and then performs malicious actions. Detecting
insider attacks are often more difficult than detecting outsider’s attacks.
In the literature, database intrusion detection has two main models (Agnew, 2003; Chandola et al., 2009), anomaly
detection and misuse detection. The anomaly detection model is based on the profile of a user’s normal behavior.
It analyzes a user’s current session and compares it against the profile representing his normal behavior. If a major
deviation is found during the comparison, an alarm will be raised. This includes monitoring the system states over a
period of time; with assume that this monitored profile can mark the “normal” profile of the system. In general, it is not
easy to implement an anomaly detection solution because profiling “normal” usage is a challenging task and anomaly
detection methods are also subjected to high false-positive rates, particularly with over-fitted “normal” profiles. On
the other hand, relaxing the margins on these profiles might result in missed attacks. In this case, fine-tuning anomaly
detection systems to find the optimum thresholds is a major issue. In contrast, the misuse detection model is based on
comparing user’s session or commands with the signature of attacks previously used by attackers. So, the signature of
attacks should be well known to be detected in this model inside regarding data. Misuse detection is clever to detect
only known attacks. However, misuse detection can sometimes detect new attacks which share characteristics with
previously known attacks.
The possibility of enhancing existing anomaly detection systems by presenting an effective database IDS constitutes
the objective of this work. The contribution of this paper is an anomaly detection system explicitly adapted to the RBAC
database system. This system builds and maintains a role profile representing precise and consistent user behavior by
means of special data structure that is able to determine role intruders. The recommended data structure is transaction-
based which extracts relationship among queries in the same transaction instead of the state-of-the-art approaches that
is query-based approach that can detect the attributes which are to be referred together but cannot detect the queries
which are to be executed together.
The paper is organized as follows: next section presents some of state-of-the art work in detecting anomalous
database requests. Then Section 3 discusses in detail the proposed work in this field. Section 4 reports the related
experimental results and then Section 5 end with concluding the paper and demonstrate some preliminary ideas for
future work.
2.  Related  work
In recent years, researchers have proposed a variety of approaches for increasing the intrusion detection efficiency
and accuracy. But most of these efforts concentrated on detecting intrusion at the network or operating system level
(Kang et al., 2005; Ghosh et al., 1999). For instance, the technique presented in Kang et al. (2005) attempts to profile
normal behavior for a program. It tries to conclude the normal system call sequences and save these sequences in the
database as normal program access patterns. These efforts, however, are not adequate for protecting the database and
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ot able of detecting malicious data corruption (i.e., what particular data in the database are manipulated by which
pecific malicious database transaction).
In the last few years, IDS for the database have been starting to take place. Very limited research deliberated the
eld of database intrusion detection. For example, the approaches in Lane and Brodley (1997) and Ming and Feng
2003) proposed architectures for intrusion tolerant database systems. However, these approaches are more focused on
rchitectures for intrusion detection, and database recovery in case of an attack instead of proposing specific algorithms
or performing the intrusion detection task on a DBMS. The technique developed in Liu (2002) has used time signatures
n finding out database intrusions. It reviews the database behavior at the level of sensor transactions. Sensor transactions
re normally small in size and have predefined semantics such as write only operations and well defined data access
atterns. If a transaction tries to update a temporal data which has already been updated during that period, an alarm
s raised. But, this algorithm is suitable only to real-time database systems.
In addition to the previous approaches, the work in Lee et al. (2000) can be regarded as a DBMS specific ID
echanism where the authors fingerprint access patterns of genuine database transactions and using them to identify
ossible intrusions. They summarize SQL queries into regular expression fingerprints. The given query is reported as
alicious if it does not match any of the existing fingerprints. However, generating and maintaining the complete set
f fingerprints for all transactions is a hard activity. Moreover, if any of the legal transaction fingerprints are missing,
t may cause many false alarms.
Among the most noticeable approaches in database intrusion detection are those in Lee et al. (2002), Hu and Panda
2003), and Hu and Panda (2004). The techniques in Lee et al. (2002) and Hu and Panda (2003) are provided for
iscovering relationships among transactions and use this information to check hidden anomalies in the database log
le. They are based on the following idea: if a data item is updated, this update does not happen alone but is accompanied
y a set of other activities that are also logged in the database log files. So, they find out the dependency among data
tems where data dependency refers to the access correlations among data items. Transactions that do not follow any
f these mined data dependency rules are marked as malicious transactions. These approaches find out malicious
ransactions by comparing those sets for different item updates (the read set, the pre-write set, and the post-write set);
owever these techniques do not focus on role profiles.
The method mentioned in Hu and Panda (2004) is a misuse detection system tailored to relational database systems. It
ses audit-log data to construct profiles that describe typical users’ activities. It identifies data items frequently accessed
ogether and saves this information for later comparison. If the system determines substantial incidents of data items
hat are accessed together, but not in normal patterns as identified before, an anomaly is marked. The disadvantage
f such an approach is that the number of users for a database system can be quite large and maintaining/updating
rofiles for such large number of users are not easy tasks. Architectures for Hippocratic databases (Chung et al.,
999) have been planned as a mechanism to protect the privacy of data they manage. But, even though the architecture
ncludes intrusion detection as a core component, it does not specify any methods for performing the intrusion detection
ask.
Approaches which are conceptually most similar to this work are Agrawal et al. (2002), Kamra et al. (2008a,b), and
ertino et al. (2005). The technique proposed by the authors in Agrawal et al. (2002) is detecting user/role anomalous
ccess to the DBMS; it profiles normal user/role behavior and uses it for detecting anomalous access; it also uses a
rofiling technique to detect SQL injections. Furthermore, the methods declared in Kamra et al. (2008a) and Bertino
t al. (2005) are talking about creating profiles for each role; not for each user. The method suggested in Kamra et al.
2008b) creates its own data structure (Triplet), which stores three basic data about the executed SQL statement (the
ommand, tables accessed, columns accessed) and then uses it to create role profiles. This method is an extended
ersion to work in Agrawal et al. (2002), in which the authors upgraded their data structure to contain information
bout the where clause to increase the efficiency of intrusion detection system. The new data structure (Quiplet) stores
ve basic information about the SQL statement (the command, tables accessed, columns accessed, tables accessed in
here clause, columns accessed in where clause).
The approach stated by the researchers in Kamra et al. (2008a) uses its own data structure to create a profile for each
ole in the database. This type of data structure preserves the dependency between SQL statements in the transaction
nd uses it in further comparisons to detect anomaly access behavior in the database. In their approach, database log
le is read to extract the list of tables accessed by the transaction and list of attributes read and written by transactions.
he main disadvantages of this approach are that; it does not keep any info about where clause in the data structure
nd doesn’t extract the correlation among queries in the same transaction. Most of the IDSs that are discussed above
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show a lot of variance in their accuracy and efficiency. The main difficulty encountered by most of them is that any
endeavor to improve the rate of correct detection of intrusion, generally causes an increase in the false alarms as well.
In this work, the attention is to build an intrusion detection scheme that employs the concept of creating profiles
based on transaction sequence for each role in the database by means of utilizing the usage of database log file to
extract profile features with the aim to improve intrusion detection performance. The main challenge in attacking the
intrusion detection problem is to extract the right information from the database traces so that accurate profiles can
be built. To address this problem, the paper proposes a new representation for the database log records, which could
hold information about a whole transaction not only a single query. Algorithms in Agrawal et al. (2002), Kamra et al.
(2008b) and Bertino et al. (2005) are very similar to the suggested approach, but this approach surpasses them in
keeping dependency between SQL statements in the same transaction.
3.  The  proposed  system
The approach this study follows is similar to the one suggested by Kamra et al. (2008a). However, the study
improves the representation of SQL commands to also include information about the sequence of SQL commands
in the transaction. The suggested ID system builds a profile for each role and is able to conclude role intruders, that
is, individuals that while holding a definite role diverge from the normal activities of that role. With respect to ID,
using roles means that the number of profiles to form and maintain is much smaller than those one would need when
considering individual users (Rao et al., 2010). This implies that an ID solution, based on RBAC, could be easily
deployed in practice.
The two difficulties reported in this work are as follows: how to construct and conserve profiles signifying precise
and stable user behavior; how to employ these profiles for carrying out the ID task at hand. The main challenge in
attacking these difficulties is to extract the right information from database traces (a set of intrusion-free training
records representing normal user behavior) so that accurate profiles can be built. When role information exists, the
problem is transformed into a supervised learning problem. Compared to the work in Kamra et al. (2008b), the proposed
system employs a new representation of the database log records that holds information about the whole transaction’s
commands not only the list of attributes read and written by transactions as in the comparable work. By using this
representation, the system may possibly enhance intrusion detection performance.
3.1.  System  design
The system’s design consists of three central constituents: the traditional DBMS tool that grips the query execution
process, the database audit log files and the ID mechanism. These modules form the new stretched DBMS that is
enriched with an independent ID system operating at the application level. The flow of interactions for the ID process
is shown in Fig. 1. Every time a transaction is issued, it is examined by the ID mechanism before execution. First, the
system transforms the new transaction into a new data structure supported by the ID mechanism (hexplet). Then, the
system checks the hexplet contrary to the existing profiles and submits the assessment of the transaction (anomalous
vs. not anomalous) to the response engine. The response engine refers a policy base of existing response mechanisms to
issue a reply depending on the assessment of the transaction submitted by the comparison process. The most common
action is to send an alert to the security administrator. However, other actions are possible such as disable the role
and disconnect the user making the access or drop the query. If by the assessment, the transaction is not anomalous,
the response engine simply updates the database audit log and the profiles with the transaction information. Before
the detection phase, the learning phase should be performed to create the initial profiles from a set of intrusion free
records from the database audit log. The readers can refer to the work of Kamra et al. (2008a) for a detailed overview
of algorithms for the production of intrusion free records.
3.2.  Hexplet  data  structureIn order to identify user behavior, the recommended system uses the database log file for querying information
regarding users’ actions. The log records, after being processed, are used to form preliminary profiles representing
acceptable actions. Each one or more entry (each single transaction) in the log file is represented as a separate data
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nit; these units are then combined to form the desired profiles. Here, the assumption is that SQL queries related to the
ame transaction are marked together in the log file.
In order to construct profiles, the system needs to preprocess the log file items and translate them into a format
hat can be analyzed. Therefore, it symbolizes each transaction by a basic data unit that holds six fields, and thus it is
alled a hexplet. User actions are characterized using sets of such hexplets. Each hexplet represents a single transaction
nd contains the following information: the first five elements represent the first SQL command in the transaction;
he SQL command issued by the user, the set of relations accessed, and for each such relation, the set of referenced
ttributes. the data unit also processes the qualification component of the query to extract information on relations and
heir corresponding attributes, which are used in the query predicate; the sixth element holds information about the
est of SQL commands in the transaction (if any).
For the sake of simplicity, the system characterizes a generic hexplet using a 6-ary relation H(c, PR, PA, SR, SA,
SQL), where c corresponds to the first SQL command, PR to the projection relation information, PA to the projection
ttribute information, SR to the selection relation information, SA to the selection attribute information, and RSQL to the
inked SQL commands (the rest SQL commands in the transaction). Table 1 shows two different transactions and their
Table 1
Examples of hexplet construction.
Transaction Hexplet
Start Transaction
SELECT
R1:A1;R1:C1;R2:B2;R2:D2
FROM R1;R2
WHERE R1:A1 = R2:B2
End Transaction
<select>
< 1; 1 >
< [1; 0; 1; 0]; [0; 1; 0; 1] >
< 1; 1 >
< [1;0; 0; 0]; [0; 1; 0; 0]>
<Null>
Start Transaction
SELECT
R1:A1;R1:C1;R2:B2;R2:D2
FROM R1;R2
WHERE R1:A1 = 5 and R2:B2 = 5
Delete From R2
Where R2:A2 = 17 and R2:B2 = 5
End Transaction
<select>
< 1; 1 >
< [1; 0; 1; 0]; [0; 1; 0; 1] >
< 1; 1 >
< [1;0; 0; 0]; [0; 1; 0; 0]>
<[<delete>
<0; 1>
<[0; 0; 0; 0]; [0; 0; 0; 0]>
<0; 1>
<[0;0; 0; 0]; [1; 1; 0; 0]>]>
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representation according in hexplets. The example considers a database schema consisting of two relations R1 = {A1;
B1; C1; D1}  and R2 = {A2; B2; C2; D2}. The complete representation of the hexplet is (SQL-CMD, PROJ-REL-BIN
[], PROJ-ATTR-BIN [][], SEL-REL-BIN[], SEL-ATTR-BIN[][], RELAT-SQL-CMD[]). The first field is symbolic and
corresponds to the first SQL command in the transaction, the second is a binary vector that contains 1 in its i-th position
if the i-th relation is projected in the SQL query. The third field is a vector of n vectors, where n is the number of
relations in the database. Element PROJ-ATTR-BIN[i][j] is equal to 1 if the SQL query projects the j-th attribute of the
i-th relation; it is equal to 0 otherwise. Likewise, the fourth field is a binary vector that contains 1 in its i-th position
if the i-th relation is used in the SQL query predicate. The fifth field is a vector of n vectors, where n is the number
of relations in the database. Element SEL-ATTR-BIN[i][j] is equal to 1 if the SQL query references the j-th attribute
of the i-th relation in the query predicate; it is equal to 0 otherwise. The sixth field is a vector with length equal to
the number of remaining SQL commands in the transaction; each element in the vector holds the same preceding five
elements.
For example if a transaction consists of three SQL Commands; then the first five fields in the hexplet will hold
information about the first SQL command in the transaction and the sixth field will be a vector of two elements; each
element consists of the same previous structure (SQL-CMD, PROJ-REL-BIN[], PROJ-ATTR-BIN[][], SEL-REL-
BIN[], SEL-ATTR-BIN[][]) and RSQL holds the information about the rest of about the rest of SQL commands comes
after in the transaction.
To summarize, in query based approach, both queries of the same transaction are recorded in different data structure
(i.e. different actions); whereas in the proposed approach complete transaction is recorded in one data structure (i.e.
queries form one action). Consider for example that the user issued the following transaction:
Start Transaction
Delete From R2 Where R2:A2 = 17 and R2:B2 = 5
Select * From R2
End Transaction
In query based approach, this action is considered as normal. It may result in false positive. But, as the proposed
approach binds all the queries of the same transaction in one behavior, it will certainly reduce the false positive rate.
3.3.  Classiﬁer
This work employs the Naive Bayes Classifier (NBC) for the ID task in RBAC-administered databases. The moti-
vation for utilizing NBC is its low computational requirements for both the training and classification task. The small
running time is mainly due to the attribute independence assumption. For a better understanding of the concepts under-
lying the NBC, the reader is encouraged to refer to the works in Kamra et al. (2008b) and Bertino et al. (2005) that
explain the optimality region for the NBC and discuss the reasons for its effective performance even when the attribute
independence assumption does not hold.
In the classification problem, a set of training examples is provided, and a new instance with attribute values is
given (correspond to the set of observations). The goal is to predict the target value, or the class, of this new instance.
The technique that is defined here is to assign to this new instance the most probable class value vclassεV  , given the
attributes (a1, .  . ., an) that describe it. That is
vclass =  arg max
vjεV
P(vj |a1, a2,  .  . ., an) (1)
Using Bayes Theorem anyone can rewrite the expression as (Bertino et al., 2005)
=  argmax
vjεV
P(a1,  a2,  . .  ., an|vj)P(vj)
P(a1,  a2,  . .  ., an)
,
∝ argmax
vjεV
P(a1,  a2,  . .  ., an|vj)P(vj),
∝ argmaxP(vj)
∏
P(ai|vj).
(2)vjεV
i
In this case, estimating P(vj) is simple since it requires just counting the frequency of vj in the training data. P(ai|vj)
requires only a frequency count over the tuples in the training data with class value equal to vj. To tackle the problem
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Table 2
Evaluation results of the proposed anomaly detection approach.
All connections New attacks excluded
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tDetection rate (%) 92.6 96.4
False positive rate(%) 1.68 1.68
f zero probability (number of observations is very small in large training sets or zero), the system adopts a standard
ayesian approach in estimating this probability as discussed in Kamra et al. (2008a).
The NBC is directly applied to the proposed anomaly detection framework by considering the set of roles in the
ystem as classes and the log file hexplets as the observations. In what follows, the researcher illustrates how equation
 can be applied for the suggested data type (hexplet). If R denotes the set of roles, the predicted role of a given
bservation (ci,  PRi ,PAi ,  SRi ,SAi ,  RSQLi ) is
rclass =  arg maxrjεR
NC∏
c=1
p(rj)p(ci|rj) ×
{
N∏
i=1
{
p(SR[i].SA[i]|rj)p (SR[i].SA[i]|rj)}
}
(3)
here N  is the number of relations in the DBMS and Nc is the number of SQL Commands in the transaction. With the
bove equation in place, the ID task is quite straightforward. For every new transaction, its rclass is predicted by the
rained classifier. If this rclass is different from the original role associated with the transaction, an anomaly is detected.
or benign transactions, the classifier can be updated in a direct way by increasing the frequency count of the relevant
ttributes. The procedure for ID can easily be generalized for the case when a user is assigned more than one role at
 time. This is because the suggested method detects anomalies on a per transaction basis rather than per user basis.
ence, as long as the role associated with the transaction is consistent with the role predicted by the classifier, the
ystem will not detect an anomaly.
.  Experimental  evaluation
In this section, several experiments were performed on the DBMS of Microsoft SQL Server 2000 on Microsoft
indows 7 Home Premium SP1 for testing the performance of the proposed approach. In all experiments, a real dataset
onsists of 2000 transactions (6500 SQL statements) is used to evaluate the proposed approach. The database itself
onsists of 55 tables with 665 different attributes in all. In the database, there exist 8 roles that access the database with
arious read only and read-write roles. The dataset used for training should be intrusion free (trusted transactions) that
s extracted from the database log file after revision for this purpose. The intrusion/anomalous queries were generated
y reading the database log file and change the role assigned to each transaction randomly (approximately 25% of the
ransactions). The queries in this dataset consist of a mix of select, insert, update, and delete commands. Furthermore,
umerous fresh, never-before-seen attacks have been used in order to access the generalization aptitude of the ID
ystem. For the experimental evaluation, the performance of the suggested approach was evaluated in terms of false
ositive and detection rates, which are estimated as follows (Tajbakhsh et al., 2009):-
False positive rate = No. of false positive
No. of normal connections
(4)
Detection rate =  1 − No. of false negative
No. of attack connections
(5)
here false positive (negative) rate is the number of normal (attack) connections labeled as an attack (normal). The
btained results are reported in Table 2. It can be concluded that the achieved detection rate is approximately optimum
or intrusion detection phase (100% detection rate of the learning phase) while the false positive rate is reserved much
ower in most cases. Some classification results on the same dataset using another technique (Kamra et al., 2008b)
re shown in Table 3. As compared to query-based approach, it can be easily verified that the proposed approach can
educe the false positive rate.
Although the execution time of the approach presented in Kamra et al. (2008a) is better than the suggested one
hat takes about 110 s for a total training time over 2000 transactions. This is because the hexplet-based detection
268 S.M. Darwish / Journal of Electrical Systems and Information Technology 3 (2016) 261–269
Table 3
Comparative resuts.
Proposed approach Query-based approach (Kamra et al., 2008b)
Detection rate (%) 96.4 91.3
False positive rate(%) 1.68 14.5
system is more complex than their system, which deals with a single SQL statement not a transaction (two or more
SQL statements). Finally, total execution time of the recommended approach is about 120 s (containing training and
testing), which is completely reasonable with regard to the number of training and testing records. The complexity
of the detection algorithm is O  (R  ×  A  ×  N  ×  Nc) where R is the number of roles in the database, A  is the number
of attributes considered by the classifier, N  is the number of relations in the DBMS and Nc is the number of SQL
Commands in the transaction. This gives us a chance to discover the opportunity of integrating the approach with other
query processing features of a database for an integrated online ID mechanism entrenched inside a database.
5.  Conclusions  and  future  work
This paper suggested a transaction-based anomaly detection system in RBAC databases. This machine learning
system is capable of extracting valuable information from the log files regarding the access patterns of queries in the
same transaction. The use of roles that are employed for training a classifier makes the system practical, even for
databases with a large user population. As compared to query-based approaches, the suggested system will certainly
diminish the false positive rate as it has deliberated the correlation among queries of a transaction. Future works include
elaborating other machine learning techniques to improve the intrusion detection accuracy and study the case when
role information is not present in the log records.
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